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Engaging Diasporas in Development and State-building: The Role of the Kurdish 
Diaspora and Returnees in Rebuilding Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
Bahar Baser (Coventry University) 
 
Abstract 
 
Diasporas can play an important part in contemporary social processes, either via remittances, 
investment, skills transfer, diaspora philanthropy or political influence. Currently, many states 
establish diaspora ministries or sub-committees under existing institutions to connect with 
their diaspora and tap their resources for development in the homeland. This paper contributes 
to this literature on the diaspora-homeland nexus by focusing on the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora 
and returnees. The paper analyzes the intricacies of diaspora and returnee involvement in 
state-building in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq by discussing their capabilities and expectations 
as well as the tensions between the diaspora and the homeland. 
 
Introduction 
The Second World Kurdish Congress (WKC) was held in the capital of the Kurdish Region of 
Iraq (KRI), Erbil, between the 12th and 14th of October 2012.1 The conference was an invitation 
to Kurdish diaspora scholars from various disciplines, which could be interpreted as a calling 
for the “scientific diaspora” (Kuschminder, 2011, p.7) to refresh their ties with the homeland. 
The first WKC was organized in 2011 in the Netherlands and focused on Kurdistan’s economy 
and society in transition. There was something special about this second gathering; it gave the 
opportunity to Kurdish diasporans around the world to have a homecoming and see the 
“miracle”2 with their own eyes.  The participants of the conference were not solely Iraqi Kurds, 
there was a sizeable community of diasporans who are Kurds of Turkish, Iranian and Syrian 
origins. The diasporic attachment, which Williams (2018, p.6) called “the altruistic tie” was 
very much present.  
 
                                                
1I participated in this conference with over 600 participants. It created transnational a platform 
for Kurdish policy makers, diplomats, civil society organizations and the diaspora to discuss 
the future of Kurdistan and its place in the Middle East. See: 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=45538. (Last access 28 February 2018).  
2 As one of my interviewees at the Congress put it, what happened to Kurdistan in the recent 
years was a “miracle”. 
Research suggests that in some cases, diasporas are ascribed parts in a national project (Shindo, 
2012, p.1699). “Diasporic patriotism varies in time and space, with patriotic flame being 
doused and ignited by a variety of origin and destination specific triggers” (Ancien et. al 2009, 
p.17). In cases where out-migration was once perceived as unpatriotic, especially in countries 
experiencing crises, the discourse has now shifted towards a more positive outlook 
characterizing the diasporas as part of the solution to underdevelopment (Mohan, 2008, p.464; 
van Hear and Cohen, 2017, p.172), or as “agents of change” (van Houte, 2014; Budabin, 2014; 
Sinatti and Horst, 2015; Rock, 2017). In post-conflict settings, diaspora contributions become 
all the more important as they can contribute to knowledge capital, capacity-building and 
investment, as well as peace-building and the strengthening of civil society (Kuschminder, 
2011; Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015).  These state-led initiatives not only tie the diaspora to the 
homeland development, but also construct a pan-ethnic discourse that aims at solidifying 
nationhood transnationally (Chan and Tran, 2011, 1103). What is special about the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq is that it has started a homeland calling for the diaspora, acting as states do, 
despite its ambiguous autonomous position within the Iraqi state.  
 
By focusing on this special case, this paper analyzes the intricacies of diasporas’ and returnees’ 
involvement in state-building in the KRI with a focus on their expectations and the tensions 
between the diaspora and the homeland. What role do the diaspora and returnees play in post-
conflict reconstruction in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)? How do their expectations 
evolve given the complexities and challenges of state-building in the homeland? What does the 
homeland expect from them and what capacities does it offer to facilitate their engagement?  
 
Methodology and Data Gathering  
The empirical data collection for this article is based on two strands of fieldwork. The first 
strand was conducted in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden between 2012 and 
2014, where I interviewed more than a hundred diaspora members, entrepreneurs and returning 
migrants from the first and second generations of the diaspora. I have also been to Iraqi 
Kurdistan twice; the first time was for the WKC in October 2012 and the other visit was a 
three-week fieldwork trip in April 2013 where I interviewed KRG diplomats, members of 
parliament as well as returnees who came back to Kurdistan permanently or temporarily. In 
these visits, I concentrated mostly on interviewees in Erbil but I have also visited Suleimaniyah 
and other small towns surrounding Erbil such as Shaqlawa.  
 
The second strand of research in 2016 focused on returnees in the KRI and included follow-up 
interviews with the KRG Representation in London and prominent diaspora entrepreneurs. I 
prepared a semi-structured interview template in consultancy with my research assistant3based 
in Duhok.  The interviews were conducted by the research assistant in three provinces, 
Suleimaniyah, Duhok and Erbil. In total 26 interviews4 were conducted with diaspora returnees 
who lived outside Kurdistan for at least ten years and who returned after 2003. Only Kurds 
who voluntarily returned to the homeland were included in the study. As a common practice in 
investigating return migration (Rock, 2017, p.206), I have used purposive and snowball 
sampling. I supplemented the interview data with official declarations by KRG policy-makers, 
diaspora organizations’ press releases and website blogs as well as information from diasporic 
and homeland’s media outlets. Overall, this multi-sited research gave me the opportunity to 
observe the sustainability of diaspora return as well as the opportunity structures developing in 
Kurdistan for diaspora and returnee engagement during a five-year period characterized by 
ebbs and flows in Kurdish politics and socioeconomic structure. Finally, I have conducted 
follow-up interviews5 with academics from the KRI in 2018 in order to validate certain aspects 
that emerged from this research.  
 
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq  
The Iraqi Kurds have suffered under various Iraqi regimes, especially during the Saddam 
Hussein era. However, third party interventions in the Middle East’s internal and international 
conflicts made it possible for the Iraqi Kurds to flourish since 1991.6 Particularly after the 2003 
US-led invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurds have been successful in formulating self-rule in Northern 
Iraq and moved towards establishing a de facto state.  
 
Since 2003, the KRG has managed to exploit the “shifting opportunity grounds in Iraq to attract 
and vest a number of international interests”, establish diplomatic representations around the 
world and gain recognition as a crucial actor in the region (Soguk, 2015, pp.964-5). It has its 
                                                
3 I thank Dr. Bayar Dosky for conducting the interviews in the KRI as part of this project.   
4 Our sample included 9 female and 17 male interviewees. One of the reasons we found it hard 
to reach female interviewees was that in most cases men return and bring their families 
afterwards or they leave them in the host countries. Secondly, the research assistant was male 
and he found it hard to reach female interviewees in Kurdistan’s relatively conservative setting.  
5 Two of these interviews were conducted face to face in London and three of them were 
conducted via skype with academics who are based in the KRI.  
6 For more information on the KRG’s “success story” and the recent economic and political 
crises see Soguk (2015) and Sumer and Joseph(2018). 
own judicial system and makes its own laws, runs its own security services, has its own 
parliament and runs its own elections. Until 2014, it had a rapidly growing economy and 
revenues from the oil sector brought about the possibility to expand its infrastructure. Since 
then, however, the KRG found itself in a dire security and financial situation including tensions 
among the Kurdish parties, conflict with the central government, a drop in oil prices, and 
fighting with ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). The KRG held a referendum in 
September 2017 when more than 90% voters supported independence from Iraq, though the 
KRG failed to receive significant support from the international community.  
 
Since 2013, at least 700 foreign companies went bankrupt, leaving around 200.000 people 
unemployed.7 KRG officials have been struggling to pay the salaries of teachers, Peshmerga 
fighters, oil industry workers and other civil servants. Moreover, after the independence 
referendum, international flights were temporarily banned by the central government and the 
KRG has lost the control of economically significant territories including Kirkuk to the Iraqi 
Army. The referendum also brought internal disputes to the fore, as the Kurdish political parties 
other than the KDP demonstrated a lukewarm approach towards the referendum. These 
developments will surely create strains in the KRG and have significant implications on 
diaspora investments and return migration in the long run.  
 
Spheres of Iraqi Kurdish Diaspora Engagement Before the Fall of Saddam 
Since 1960s, large numbers of Kurdish refugees have been forced to flee Kurdistan (Wahlbeck, 
2013, p.44). There have been two significant waves of conflict-induced Kurdish migration 
from Iraq. The first one happened in 1988 when thousands of Kurds fled from the genocidal 
Anfal offensives8 by the Saddam regime. The second wave occurred in 1991, when Kurdish 
rebellions were brutally suppressed by the Iraqi regime after the Iraqi Army’s defeat in Kuwait 
(van Bruinessen, 1998, p.43). Kurdish leaders went into exile and started establishing 
transnational networks which connected Kurdish voices to the rest of the world. These 
migration flows have also grown in size due to family reunification, and gradually Kurds 
abroad have come to constitute one of the largest diasporas in the world.  
 
                                                
7 http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/reports/349883. (Last access 28 March 2018). 
8 The Anfal Campaigns refer to the Saddam Regimes genocidal campaign against the Iraqi 
Kurds between 1986 and 1989, killing almost 200.000 people. The Halabja chemical attack 
occurred on 16 March 1988 and killed more than 5000 Kurdish civilians.  
While struggling with statelessness and feeling of victimhood, these Kurds managed to create 
a transnational network and used their exile experience to influence the situation back in their 
homeland. Van Hear and Cohen (2017, p.172-3) suggest that “the variety of characterizations 
of the role of diasporas in conflict might be explained by differentiating forms of diaspora 
engagement and the public and private spaces in which they occur”. Although they admit that 
these suggested categories might overlap, they theorise diaspora interventions by 
distinguishing three spheres of engagement: a) the household/the extended family sphere, b) 
the “known community” and c) the imagined community. In this section, I will analyse Iraqi 
Kurdish diaspora interventions in the KRI following this categorization.  
 
The Household/Extended Family Sphere: Van Hear and Cohen (2017, p.173) investigate the 
manners in which diasporans engage in private and personal transnational relations. Diasporans 
send money to nuclear families so that they can survive under pressing conditions. My 
interviews with Iraqi Kurdish diasporans also revealed that, especially in the beginning of the 
exile experience, the household/family sphere was given the utmost importance. One 
interviewee who returned to the KRI recently stated that “Well, at the time I was the main 
chance of economy for our family at that times. We sent hundreds of dollars to the family that 
family could survive. I’m talking about 1990s and 2000s so economically (it) was good.” The 
importance of remittances also echoes in Lisa Pelling’s excellent study (2013, p.3) on the 
Kurdish Diaspora. Since 2003, physical visits and family reunions also became highly feasible, 
especially thanks to the introduction of direct flights from European capitals to the KRI.  
 
The Known Community Sphere: Here a diaspora member’s engagement focus on known 
community including encounters in schools, neighbourhoods, workplaces, markets and shops, 
and mosques among other places. The Kurds established local associations which usually 
organized cultural activities such as the Newroz celebrations (Wahlbeck, 2013). A majority of 
my interviewees stated that they regularly attended such local organizations rather than 
political ones. The main activities revolved around culture and language which helped them 
keep their “Kurdishness” and transfer their identity to the next generations. My interviews also 
show that these associations are often the first stops for newcomers who do not know their way 
around in the hostland. Apart from the associations, the known community networks also 
helped the newcomers establish businesses, engage in business partnerships as well as finding 
spouses.  
 
The Imagined Community: This category includes membership of political parties in exile, 
support for insurgent or loyalist groups, advocacy networks and lobbying. As Wahlbeck (2013, 
pp.51-2) has observed, diaspora Kurds were highly politicized and have established political 
organizations to support the Kurdish cause. Political parties opened branches and political 
rivalries back in the homeland also surfaced in diaspora spaces. Dominant political parties in 
the KRI opened branches in several European countries and tried to shift the agenda of the 
diasporans towards their aims and interests in the transnational space. The KDP and the PUK 
have existed for a long time while during the recent years, the Gorran movement also gathered 
significant supporter base in the diaspora.  
 
Political mobilisation for the homeland took different shapes and forms in Kurdish diaspora 
spaces. Diasporans first and foremost tried to draw attention to the massacres against Kurds in 
Iraq (e.g., the Anfal campaigns of 1987-8) by organizing protest events and lobbying European 
governments to stop the persecution of Kurds. The first comers also established institutions 
which are highly influential even today. One example is the Kurdish Institute, which was 
established in 1983.9 Diaspora Kurds also established TV channels, which Hassanpour (1998, 
p.53) defines as “sovereignty in the sky”, new technologies and diaspora mobilisation created 
“Kurdish flags from satellites.”  
 
As Natali (2004, p.111) argues “shifts in international norms, active and influential diaspora 
networks have semi-legitimized the idea of Kurdish statehood”. The patriotic behaviours of 
diaspora Kurds have sustained a longing for a “free Kurdistan”, in the words of many 
interviewees, and the “myth of return” - which is an essential component of the diasporic 
psyche - has been kept as a vivid goal. A majority of interviewees stated that when they left 
they perceived their departure as temporary and planned to return to Kurdistan “when the time 
is right”. My observations reveal that although after the 1990s some Kurds did return to their 
homes, for the majority of them the fall of Saddam regime and a politically and economically 
thriving KRG have been perceived as major turning points in return decisions.  
 
Diasporas as Agents of Change? 
                                                
9 Interview with the President of the Kurdish Institute, Kendal Nezan, November 2013, Paris, 
France.  
The growing importance of diaspora politics has been gathering increasing interest during the 
last decade as their leverage in both home and hostland politics have increased due to “new 
technologies and the rise of global media and communications that allow dispersed populations 
to engage in transnational politics in real time” (Adamson, 2006, p.291; van Hear and Cohen, 
2017, p.172). Diasporas are believed to act as bridges between the home and host countries 
(Nielsen and Riddle, 2009, p.436) and they are “perceived as both insider and outsider in their 
countries of origin” (Sheido, 2012, p.1688). Moreover, diasporas accumulate human, financial 
and social capital in their hostlands, and if these valuable skills could be transferred to the 
homeland, it might be a cure for under-development and aid post-conflict reconstruction 
(Williams, 2018, p.6).  
 
As Brinkerhoff (2009, p.79) suggests, diasporans are more likely to invest in economies of 
post-conflict homelands while other foreign investors might find it too risky. Similarly, Nielsen 
and Riddle (2009, p.435) state that as post-conflict economies are often found too daunting by 
foreign investors, many nations reach out to their diasporas for much-needed foreign 
investment capital. Besides, Kuschminder (2011, p.4) suggests there is also increasing 
evidence of non-economic contributions on issues such as human rights, good governance and 
capacity building in the homeland. They might act as advocacy networks and establish 
relationships with various stakeholders to contribute to short and long-term development needs 
and democratization in the homeland (Budabin, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Kent, 2006).   
 
International organizations, as well as home and host states, often fund temporary return 
programmes which facilitate diasporas’ short-term return to the country of origin to train peers 
or transfer knowledge (Kuschminder, 2011, p.4). Moreover, as shown in the case of WKC, the 
homeland policy-makers might issue a “homeland calling” (Baser, 2018) to invite the diaspora 
to return to contribute to the rehabilitation process. However, realities and expectations do not 
always meet in the middle when it comes to encouraging return. While “wealthy people from 
the diaspora” (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p.78) might return with high expectations and get 
disappointed when they do not receive the heroes’ welcome “they deserved”, others might 
return with no intention to turn themselves into “diaspora heroes”. Van Houte and Davids 
(2014) reveal that return experiences are heterogeneous and not all returnees have the capacity 
or the will to act as agents of change. Moreover “motivations of return define an important part 
of the post-return experience” (van Houte and Davids, 2014, p.77). Therefore, while some 
returnees who returned out of failure might choose to keep a low profile; others who want to 
transfer their success story back to the homeland might expect a heroes’ welcome. “Most 
diasporas demonstrate commitment to their homelands through repeated small scale charitable 
acts” (Kent, 2006, p.457) and they keep their emotional attachments to their homelands. 
However, economic investment entails other factors besides these psychological reasons 
(Brenick and Silbereisen, 2012). Nielsen and Riddle (2009) suggest there are three main 
motivations for diasporans to invest in their home countries, financial, emotional and social. 
These motivations, as well as the conditions of the receptions of their engagement, creates the 
space for them to make a difference in their homelands.  
 
Challenges of Diasporic Homecomings  
Once policy makers in the homeland are aware of the potential of the diaspora to contribute to 
homeland interests, they usually formulate policies to create an institutional relationship which 
can harness diasporas’ resources. Homeland politicians’ discourse towards the returnees and 
diasporans are highly important in this regard. Additionally, home states as well as 
international organizations “need to create an enabling environment to put in place the 
conditions that will create incentives and facilitate the efforts of diasporans” (Brinkerhoff 2009, 
p. 75).  Especially in cases where the diaspora remained isolated from the homeland due to 
conflict, then navigating bureaucratic red tape and establishing new businesses can be a highly 
challenging task for the diasporans (Nielsen and Riddle 2009, p.443).  
 
Financial incentives can stimulate diaspora interest but they are not enough to sustain it, as 
other challenges occur along the way. Nepotism, a lack of transparency, political connections 
and differences might also determine the limits of diaspora engagement in homeland affairs. 
In Afghanistan, van Houte (2014, p.578) identified three distinct ways that the returnees 
adapted to deal with these problems: changing, avoiding and rejecting. In her words, “the 
changers were returnees who wanted to combine their European higher education, working 
experience and ideas with their identification in Afghanistan and the desire to reclaim an 
influential (political) position” (pp.578-79). However, not all her interviewees had a desire to 
challenge the long-established structures, and they opted for avoiding them by seeking 
opportunities elsewhere such as in the private sector and international NGOs. Others have 
rejected incorporating into the new context altogether (van Haute, 2014, p.580). Paasche 
(2016a, 2016b) also revealed that corruption in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq constituted a 
barrier to the reintegration of Kurdish returnees from Europe. A neutralised return, free from 
politics could be more appealing to the diaspora members who plan return (Shindo, 2012, 
p.1699), however it is rarely the case.  
 
While so much attention has been given to how diasporans and returnees can engage in 
homeland development activities, little research has been carried out on how locals who stayed 
during the conflict actually perceive such interventions (Rock, 2017, p.205). As previous 
research shows, ethnic ties do not necessarily bring a feeling of shared destiny and future 
(Rock, 2017; Baser and Toivanen, 2018). Diasporas can only contribute fully when there is 
harmony between the homeland policies, expectations and capabilities of both sides, and also 
when there is a working relationship between the locals and the diasporans/returnees.  
 
Does the KRG Have a Diaspora Strategy?  
As Ancien et.al put it, “a diaspora strategy is an explicit and systematic policy initiative or 
series of policy initiatives aimed at developing and managing relationships with a diaspora” 
(Ancien et al, 2009, p.3). The KRG adapted both “tapping and embracing” (Gamlen, 2015, p. 
168) approaches at the discursive level. At the same time, no legal/institutional framework 
about returnees has been implemented so far despite the abundance of diaspora resources. 
Many politicians also referred to the potential of diaspora contributions for state-building in 
Kurdistan. For instance, KRG’s Head of Foreign Relations, Falah Mustafa Bakir stated that: 
“The KRG has always encouraged those with experience and expertise to return to their 
homeland and contribute to our ongoing success and help us improve the performance of our 
government and the services we provide to our people.”10 In another interview, he referred to 
the diaspora Kurds as the “ambassadors of Kurdistan”.11 My interviews with high-ranking 
politicians in 2013 also included talks on a potential Diaspora Ministry as a sub-unit under the 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, which would deal specifically with this policy. The KRG, 
however, is yet to formulate such policies.12 Dr. Sardar Aziz, who returned to take a position 
as a senior advisor to the KRG, states that the current economic difficulties crippled 
government from taking any step in that direction and the diasporans hesitate to return now for 
reasons of security, economic crises and lack of services.13 
                                                
10http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&s=02010200&r=73&a=45562&s=010000.(Last 
access 28 March 2018). 
11 http://www.rudaw.net/english/interview/10062017. (Last access 28 March 2018). 
12 For more information on KRG’s diaspora engagement policies see Baser (2018).  
13 Author’s interview with Dr. Sardar Aziz, June 2018.  
 The KRG’s diplomatic missionsare responsible for its paradiplomacy and public diplomacy 
efforts and work in close cooperation with the diasporans (Baser, 2018). The diasporans were 
also allowed to vote at the independence referendum in 201714, which could be interpreted as 
an incipient external-voting right practiced by the Kurdish quasi-state. It is also no surprise 
that, after the independence referendum, the former President of the KRG, Masoud Barzani 
turned to the diaspora and made a historical call to diaspora Kurds to stage protests and engage 
in civil activities in a legal and peaceful manner to garner support for the KRG.15  
 
The KRG has expectations from its diaspora, especially in the economic realm (Baser, 2018), 
but at the same time does not create the incentives to facilitate diaspora engagement as 
suggested above by Brinkerhoff (2006) and Nielsen and Riddle (2009). My interviews with the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Board of Investment in Kurdistan revealed that although the 
KRG has invested significant effort in determining in which areas there is need for investment, 
diasporans were still treated equally with other foreign investors and do not receive specific 
advantages by law to invest in the KRI.16 Facilitation of diasporic returns with regards to 
investment, then, has been dependent on who has connections to ruling political parties and 
who can easily receive permits and land necessary to establish their business.  
 
One of my main observations is that the KRG engages with its diaspora in an ad-hoc rather 
than a sustained manner, a finding echoed in other studies on KRG-diaspora relations. (e.g., 
Eccarius-Kelly, 2018, p.18). My interviewees in Europe complained that party networks and 
clientelism played an important role in determining which diaspora member can be included 
in the joint projects with homeland policy makers. When asked about the role that the diaspora 
can play, interviewees usually stated that the KRG has to formulate policies to facilitate 
                                                
14 Diaspora Kurds also have the right to vote or to be elected if they are Iraqi citizens and can 
provide the necessary documentation required to practice these rights. 
15 http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/201020177. (Last access 28 March 2018). 
16 The KRG has introduced various laws including the Investment Law (July 2006) which 
stated that foreign investors shall be treated as national and local investors. The law did not 
provide any exemptions to the diaspora therefore diaspora entrepreneurs were treated the same 
way as nationals or foreign investors, unless of course they have a special agreement with the 
KRG via personal initiatives and contacts. See the law: 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/print.aspx?l=12&smap=010000&p=293 (Last Access June 2018). 
Currently the KRG is introducing new tax systems for private sector therefore these laws might 
change in the short run. See: http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/economy/7543c01a-6b71-438f-
91c6-b3fe6c205a28.  
diasporan’s entry into social and political spheres in the KRI. For some interviewees, the KRG 
itself was the barrier preventing diaspora engagement: “If the government let them…” or “If 
they are given the chance…” were some of the phrases used by the sceptics among diasporans 
and returnees. One interviewee also suggested that the divisions within the diaspora may also 
prevent them from effectively engaging: “Having a Kurdish community there was effective, 
sometimes it could solve problems, but sometimes diaspora itself was a problem.”17 
 
The Iraqi Kurdish Diaspora in Europe: Nation and State-building from afar in the Post-
Saddam Era 
I have conducted interviews with diaspora Kurds between 2012 and 2014 when the KRG was 
still thriving and the economic and political crises remained dormant.  The KRG’s autonomous 
status was perceived as a highly significant achievement and its profile eased the pain caused 
by statelessness while they were in exile. The majority of interviewees showed patriotic 
motivations above anything else. The KRG’s eventual goal of independence gave diasporans 
a target to work for.18 A majority of the interviewees stated that they started visiting the region 
quite often, but that they had not made immediate return decisions. They had established 
businesses or stable jobs in their host countries and were also concerned about the future of 
their children. I observed a trend of male diaspora members’ paying a couple of visits to the 
KRI, or even engaging in circular migration in order to test the waters in Kurdistan before 
making the decision of permanent return. For those who were politically active in exile and 
had close connections to the ruling parties, return was a preferred option as they took highly 
prestigious positions either in the parliament or as advisors to high-ranking politicians.  
 
Diaspora groups which were close to the KDP started following the political agenda set by the 
KRG. Those who were aligned to other parties still joined lobbying and advocacy networks, 
taking a step back at times when they perceived a clash of interests. For instance, the members 
of the Gorran party in Berlin told me that they felt sidelined by the KDP when there is an event 
in Germany.19 There are, however, other platforms which bring all groups together and raise 
                                                
17 Interview with a returnee from Germany, Erbil, April 2016. 
18 Although patriotic motivations played big role in convincing the diasporans to return, the 
political situation in the KRI as well as the economic crisis compelled many to re-return to 
their host countries. This shows that initial motivations might not be sustained after return and 
priorities might be reshuffled depending on the ever-evolving situation in the homeland.  
19 Author’s interview with Gorran Representatives in Berlin, April 2013.  
the profile of the KRI as a whole such as the Kurdish Institute in Paris20 as well as 
commemoration events for Halabja.  In fact, one of the most influential activities of the 
diaspora, in collaboration with KRG diplomatic representations, was to push for the recognition 
of the Anfal as genocide. Receiving support from Kurdish-origin MPs in Sweden, Norway and 
the UK, Kurdish diaspora prepared petitions and lobbied host country governments to discuss 
this issue in their parliaments. Recognition of the Anfal as genocide might also serve for 
legitimizing the Kurdish quest for statehood, and the diaspora put it at the centre stage of its 
transitional justice efforts (Baser and Toivanen, 2017). Most recently, many Kurds organized 
large protests in the USA, Canada as well as Europe to condemn the KRG’s loss of control of 
disputed territories in October 2017. These recent developments made diaspora diplomacy and 
advocacy all the more important again; they are needed to legitimize the quest for statehood in 
the eyes of the international community by lobbying, protesting and constantly negotiating with 
national and supranational institutions.  
 
Diaspora entrepreneurs were usually recruited by the KRG and were invited to contribute to 
specific projects in sectors which the KRG seems important for building a state. For instance, 
an interviewee in Sweden testified that he had received an invitation to contribute to the 
development of the healthcare sector in the KRI. He founded the “Swedish Hospital” in Erbil 
with the support of both the Board of Investment in the KRG and Swedish companies. 
Previously, many Kurdish patients who had heart disease or diabetes had been travelling to 
Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey for treatment. Although he had hoped the project would create 
employment opportunities for local Kurds, he was unable to find sufficiently qualified locals 
to work in a hospital and had to source workers from Turkey, Romania, Slovenia and Iran. He 
felt that in the absence of systematic training and other educational possibilities he was unable 
contribute further to the local economy.21 Examples of this sort can be multiplied. For instance, 
other returnees opened cafes in Ankawa, a posh neighbourhood in Erbil, or restaurants and 
supermarket chains in different districts of KRI. The presence of oil sector workers and 
constant visits of diplomatic missions and foreign investors also created demands for 
hospitality industry. Among my interviewees, there were returnees from the US who opened 
hotels in Erbil which became popular for visitors from the US. Others have returned to become 
                                                
20 Interview with Kendal Nezan, Paris, November 2013.  
21 Author’s interview, November 2012, Stockholm, Sweden. 
language teachers in private schools which are usually preferred by the political elite as well 
as the returnees.   
 
According to Newzad Hirori, the president of the Kurdish Library in Stockholm, Iraqi 
Kurdistan needs all sorts of infrastructure and human capital and the Kurdish diaspora is a great 
resource to address this gap. However, Hirori asserts, the KRG has not created a systematic or 
strategic way of tapping into the resources of the diaspora. Echoing the previous interviewee, 
he suggests that the diaspora could train the locals, thus empowering locals to develop the 
region themselves.22 An interviewee, who is a doctor in the Netherlands, complained that 
although she had interesting ideas to develop the health sector, she could not find anyone to 
encourage her and move the project forward because she had no political connections.23 Some 
interviewees also complained that getting things done in Kurdistan was a “bureaucratic 
nightmare”. A business permit approval might take up to a year, there is bribery involved and 
despite the tax relief incentives, many diasporans simply give up before they complete the 
business projects they had in mind.  
 
Socially, diaspora Kurds also engage in a variety of projects that are supported by the KRG. 
For instance, many diaspora Kurds are taking part in projects supported by the Swedish 
humanitarian aid organization QANDIL, which has an office in Erbil.24 The Kurdish Womens’ 
Association in Sweden has organized a number of seminars in the KRI teaching women about 
their rights and the “Swedish model” of democracy. Other interviewees reported that the 
dysfunctional education system of the KRG is significant subject of debate amongst diaspora 
Kurds. Teacher training programs, short term staff exchanges as well as vocational training is 
a top priority on the agenda of diaspora organizations. There are also many diaspora initiatives 
which aim at strengthening civil society and women’s rights in the KRI. Iranian and Kurdish 
Women’s Rights Organization which was founded in the UK in 2002 or the Kurdish Women’s 
Rights Watch are just a few examples of a larger spectrum of initiatives. 25  
 
The social sphere sometimes becomes the only sphere for the critics of the ruling parties in the 
diaspora to make their contributions as the economic and political sphere is controlled by the 
                                                
22 Author’s interview with Newzad Hirori, November 2012, Stockholm, Sweden. 
23 Author’s interview, October 2013, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.  
24 http://www.qandil.org/. (Last access 28 March 2018). 
25 See: http://ikwro.org.uk/. (Last access 28 March 2018). 
state elites with no room for dissident voices. Therefore, diaspora and returnees’ social 
remittances become all the more important to push for development of civil society and human 
rights as well as democratization in the KRI. Overall, diaspora contributions are more visible 
in government, education and private sectors in addition to media and civil society. 
Nonetheless, transformation via knowledge and skill transfer from the diaspora is a long 
process that is difficult to detect immediately and will bear fruits in the long run.26 
 
Returning to the “Homeland” 
There is still no systematic study of the number of the returnees and their potential economic, 
social and political contributions to a post-2003 KRI. The KRG officials I have interviewed 
confirmed that they do not have reliable statistics on how many people have returned since 
2003 and how many are potentially participating in circular migration. The lack of data on this 
matter also makes it hard for the international organizations to develop projects accordingly. 
International organizations such as the IOM (International Organization for Migration) are 
organizing assisted return programmes for the Kurdish refugees who are settled in the UK, 
France and the Netherlands. During my interview with the representatives of IOM offices27, I 
was told that it is actually very hard to find people who want to return - even temporarily -to 
give vocational training to the locals or to set up small businesses. A systematic mapping of 
the diaspora is therefore in order to tailor policies both by the governments and host-country 
national or international actors. 
 
Having tried to map the profile of returnees during this research, I have become cautious of 
making generalisations – in reality, the group is notable for its heterogeneity. As in the case of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, many diasporans went into exile and come back for political reasons. 
They were always engaged in homeland politics and when the time was right, they returned. 
For instance, Dr. Fuad Hussein, who was an exile in the Netherlands and returned to the KRI 
to become the Chief of Staff to the KRG Presidency, states: “since 2005 I am a member of 
cabinet and we had some cabinets- %80 of them were from the diaspora… now perhaps half 
of them.” He stated that many Kurds in exile actually went on with their education and studied 
in Europe, now they come back as experts in their field. “That is why”, he says, “diaspora plays 
                                                
26 Author’s interview with Dr. Sardar Aziz, June 2018.  
27The interviews took place in London (December 2012), Paris (November 2013), In the Hague 
(September 2013), in Geneva (May 2016), in Germany (April 2016).  
a big role in administration.”28 These examples can be multiplied. Dr. Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, who 
lived in the UK for many years, returned to Kurdistan to take a post as the Minister of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research in the KRG. Before that, he founded the Kurdish Scientific 
and Medical Association, which lobbied US and UK governments for Kurdish causes. Qubad 
Talabani, a son of former Iraqi President and the leader of the PUK, Jalal Talabani, served as 
the PUK’s representative and then KRG’s representative to the US until 2012. He then returned 
to take a position as the Deputy Prime Minister of the KRG in 2014 (Eccarius-Kelly, 2018, 
p.26-27). 
 
Apart from political remittances, returnees could also remit economically to the newly 
developing region. Many managerial jobs are currently taken by foreigners in Kurdistan, and 
foreign expertise is often imported (Hautaniemi et.al., 2013: 81). The diaspora offers an 
important asset to break this cycle. In order to facilitate this, the KRG has opened an official 
website which informs first and second-generation diaspora Kurds about how to return and 
potential job opportunities in Kurdistan. The website also shows testimonies from previous 
returnees who give a positive outlook about their experience and advice about what to and not 
to expect.29 
 
The returnee accounts from my own interviews also revealed that many first and second-
generation diaspora Kurds who returned state altruistic reasons as their primary motivation. 
One of the interviewees said: “They need people like me who lived abroad, who can speak 
different languages, familiar with different cultures.”30 Another returnee from the UK said: “I 
was constantly encouraged by my parents to think about my future in Kurdistan.”31 It became 
clear to me that these diasporans never cut relations with their homeland, and the second-
generation who were born in Europe actually grew up with transnational attachments to the 
region and its history. A returnee from the UK explained that he returned after living abroad 
for the last 20 years because he feels the urge to transfer his skills and knowledge into the 
Kurdish region.32  
 
                                                
28 Author’s interview with Dr. Fuad Hussein, April 2013, Erbil, KRI.  
29 http://kw.krg.org/en/diaspora. (Last access 28 March 2018). 
30 Author’s interview, Erbil, April 2013. 
31 Author’s interview, Erbil, April 2013. 
32 Author’s interview, Erbil, April 2013. 
The secondary motivation that came to the fore during the interviews was the economic 
opportunities in Kurdistan. According to one of the interviewees33, the economic crisis in 
Europe was a “blessing in disguise” for the Kurdish Region as many young Kurds from Europe 
felt frustrated with the declining opportunities in various European cities and decided to come 
and try their luck in Kurdistan instead. Lastly, especially among the 2016 fieldwork cohort, 
there were a high number of interviewees who also stated that they returned for family-related 
reasons.  Therefore, in parallel to what van Houte (2014) suggested, motivations for return and 
capacities to politically, economically and socially remit vary.  
 
Especially between 2012 and 2014, the interviewees mentioned that they found jobs in public 
sector due to their academic degrees or language skills. When I visited the Foreign Affairs 
Headquarters in Erbil, it seemed to me that most of the civil servants working there were young 
people who returned from abroad. They immediately took key positions in foreign affairs and 
the oil sector because they also connected their host countries’ policy makers to the KRG, 
acting as bridges. Their language skills helped them work as translators during diplomatic 
meetings and gave them the opportunity to be employed as interpreters by foreign companies. 
At the same time, the KRG’s diaspora management falls short of institutionalizing this kind of 
a return practice. Many interviewees complained that obtaining work permits and bureaucratic 
matters took too much time, creating an atmosphere of deterrence. The process usually takes 
place within the realm of personal contacts, prior political party loyalties and family and friend 
networks. Having said that, the returnees underlined that they observed progress in that realm, 
and that merit-based employment has been increasing. In particular, private firms in the oil 
business are increasingly hiring people through websites or job portals, and agencies offer 
merit-based recruitment opportunities.  
 
Although the economic boom painted a rosy picture of Kurdistan until 2013, some problems 
were already a cause for concern as far back as 2003. As mentioned, people without prior 
connections and job possibilities have found it hard to come back. Secondly, the ones who have 
returned face a variety of problems. First of all, return migration, especially after exile, is not 
a simple homecoming and requires seriously tailored policies and strategies (Hautaniemi et.al., 
2013) Especially among the 2016 interview cohort, we have observed complaints about 
reintegration policies for returnees. For example, education remains one of the many problems 
                                                
33 Author’s interview with a returnee from the UK, Erbil, April 2013. 
for the returnee families. Their children cannot speak perfect Kurdish and they usually go to 
the “expat schools” as one of the interviewees called it.34 Some interviewees also mentioned 
that although they returned thinking about Kurdistan’s future, they sometimes feel that they 
had put their children’s future at stake.  
 
My findings confirm the previous finding that returnees perceive corruption as a major issue 
in the KRG (Paasche 2016b, p. 129). Interviewees in 2016 stated that “there is no law and there 
is high level of corruption”35 and that they found it morally hard to integrate since they were 
used to European way of life and do not know their way around in a different setting.  - In the 
case of the KRI,  three categories of returnees’ reactions to corruption - changing, avoiding 
and rejecting were all present (van Houte 2014, p. 578). This moral dilemma (Paasche, 2016b, 
p.134), created a significant amount of frustration for some of the interviewees, while some 
others had a “give it time” approach. I have also noticed some interviewees found a way to 
deal with disappointments by simply adapting a “loving Kurdistan with its imperfections” 
approach, while others interpreted what is happening as a “wasted opportunity” for the future 
of the Kurdish nation. Another matter that came up frequently in the interviews was the 
question of patronage and its impact on any types of diaspora and returnee engagement, (also 
observed by Paasche 2016b, p.133). Especially in the testimonies conducted in 2016, there is 
a noticeable resentment against nepotism as well as the damaging rivalries between different 
political parties for the future of Kurdistan.  
 
One of the most striking elements of my fieldwork in the KRI in 2013 was to see that a sizeable 
number of the returnees referred to themselves as “expats” or as “internationals”. As returnees, 
they “continued their negotiations on history, identity and nationhood” which shows that “the 
construction and reconstruction of identity is a never-ending project” (Chan and Tran, 2011, 
pp.1101-2).  What Chan and Tran (2011, p.1108) called the “cultural territory” was very much 
present for many returnees, erecting invisible barriers between themselves and the locals. I 
could observe that some of them would be the new middle class in the KRI and they seemed 
as if they were parachuted to a new reality. They preferred to attend European style cafes and 
restaurants where foreigners go, and live in gated communities where foreigners live. While 
                                                
34See also: 
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Kurdish-diaspora-students-seek-KRG-s-attention.html. (Last access 28 March 2018). 
35 Interview with a returnee from the UK, Duhok, April 2016.  
others seemed to have adapted immediately as if they were grown up there. I have not, however, 
detected a correlation between their new attitudes and their integration levels in the host 
country. For instance, a returnee could be very well-integrated into his/her host country but at 
the same time can adapt easily to the new conditions in Kurdistan upon return. While another 
returnee who returned due to failure of integration in the host country might find it very hard 
to adapt to the new conditions in Kurdistan. A confluence of many factors such as age, 
education, motivations for return, class, networks both at home and abroad determined the 
experience of return.  
 
When it comes to relations with the locals, the interviewees gave varying answers. On the one 
hand, some of them talked openly about frictions with the locals. A returnee from UK said the 
following: 
 
“I brought with me loads of experience in the UK… I want to teach them, help them with 
what I know…But, you have to do it in a very subtle way…you can’t make it as if you 
are condescending and you show the cultural and class gap… if you do that, there is no 
dialogue. This is very very dangerous…”36 
 
A returnee from the USA stated that: “I know people who told me now that Kurdistan has 
money… that is why you are coming back from USA and Europe”.37 For another interviewee 
who returned from the USA a couple of years ago, there was a massive gulf between the locals 
and the “internationals.”  On the other hand, a high number of testimonies revealed no tension 
whatsoever. For instance, a returnee from Canada mentioned that the locals “always care about 
returnees” and they asked her many times whether she feels good in Kurdistan.38 Another 
interviewee added that “I am learning a lot from the Kurds here, from political, cultural and 
social perspective… It doesn’t exist in Europe.” For him reintegration was a two-way street 
and both locals and returnees should adapt to each other as they have a lot to learn from each 
other.39  
 
Conclusion 
                                                
36 Author’s interview with a returnee from the UK, Erbil, April 2013. 
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The KRG’s desire to reach out to its diaspora is not exceptional. Many home states have been 
formulating policies to tap into their diasporas’ material and non-material resources for many 
years. What is interesting in the KRG’s case is its ambiguous status as an autonomous entity 
within war-torn Iraq. This post-2003 atmosphere gave incentives to Iraqi Kurdish diasporans 
who had been living in exile in the USA, Europe and elsewhere to either return or contribute 
to the prosperity of the homeland from afar. In line with Cohen and van Hear’s (2017) three 
frameworks that examine diasporic identity, one can argue that diaspora Kurds kept their 
attachments to the homeland in their family circles, known and imagined community, while at 
the same time trying to influence politics at home and abroad. Since 2003, they managed to 
transfer skills and know how to their homeland either with engaging from afar or returning to 
the homeland temporarily and permanently. The most visible contributions occurred in 
government, education and private sector in addition to media and civil society and time will 
tell their long-term impact on Kurdish politics and society.  
 
This study confirms findings of the previous studies in on the subject of return. Echoing van 
Houte (2014), I found that the motivations of diasporans vary and the returnees do not have a 
single profile. Some return because of failure to integrate in the host country, while others have 
more altruistic or financial motives which determine their decisions, which begs for further 
research to examine varying reasons for return. Similar to Paasche (2016b, p.132), I have also 
found that the diasporans usually had the will and the capacity to transfer knowledge and values 
to the KRI, however they lacked a clear strategy to do so. As in the case of many state-led 
diaspora initiatives (Williams, 2018), the KRI also felt short in creating an enabling 
environment for the diasporans to contribute more effectively. While, the KRG has made a 
discursive commitment to collaborate with its diaspora in a variety of areas, it does not yet 
have an institutionalized diaspora policy.  
 
Considering the current crisis that the KRI has been facing since 2013, it is possible to argue 
that the diaspora and returnee contributions matter more than ever, as other types of foreign 
direct investment will likely decline. However, the opportunities that the KRI can offer to the 
diasporans and returnees have also been affected by these recent developments. The KRG 
could not pay the salaries of civil servants for a long time, the unemployment rate is strikingly 
high and the KRG still does not offer diaspora-specific incentives for economic investments. 
Returnees complain about corruption, nepotism and rivalries among Kurdish political parties 
as the biggest problems that the KRI must address in the future. There is a risk that these 
problems could trigger a re-return to the host countries (Baser and Toivanen, 2018).  It has also 
been reported that many young Kurds have started to leave Kurdistan during the last five years 
(Eccarius-Kelly, 2018). Recent developments show that the KRG urgently requires a more 
systematic and sustained diaspora engagement strategy which will re-energise diaspora-
homeland relations and create more avenues for cooperation. The post-referendum 
developments can trigger “diasporic patriotism” (Ancien et. al 2009) and, if used in a structured 
and targeted way, can rekindle diaspora interests in advancing the homeland’s prosperity at a 
time when it is needed the most.  
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